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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3717
________________
JEFFREY D. HILL,
                  Appellant
   v.
COUNTY COMMISSIONER RICHARD NASSBERG;
COUNTY COMMISSIONER REBECCA BURKE;
COUNTY COMMISSIONER ERNEST LARSON;
CHIEF ASSESSOR JAMES CARPENTER;
CENTURY 21 APPRAISALS OF MIDDLETOWN, PA;
COUNTY SOLICITOR PETER BURCHANOWSKI
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-1336)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
November 23, 2005
Before: ROTH, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGE
(Filed February 8, 2006)
    _______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Jeffrey D. Hill appeals the order of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint against individual Commissioners of
Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, and other defendants.  This is Hill’s second complaint
in which he makes broad allegations of corruption, fraud, and general unfairness in the
reassessment of real estate values in the county.  Among other things, he asserts that the
assessors deliberately appraised “high-crime, blighted, ghetto land parcels” to have the
highest value while undervaluing “exclusive, large, wealthy estate land parcels” in order
to benefit “the rich and politically-privileged at everyone else’s expense,” subjecting
racial minorities, senior citizens, and lower-income citizens to a discriminatory,
disproportionate tax burden.  The District Court dismissed Hill’s first such complaint (and
amended complaint) for failure to state a claim, concluding that Hill had failed to allege
an injury and lacked standing to bring the complaint.  We dismissed as frivolous Hill’s
appeal in that matter, noting that he had averred that he owned no real estate subject to
reassessment, and that the allegations of harm to third parties was insufficient to show an
injury in fact.  Hill v. Nassberg, et al., C.A. No. 04-4570 (3d Cir. May 12, 2005).
Shortly thereafter, Hill filed in District Court the complaint sub judice, in which he
essentially repeated his claims from the previous complaint but included an additional
assertion of injury.  Specifically, he contended that the property reassessment caused his
rent to be increased in 2005, because his rent helps to pay the landlord’s property taxes. 
In turn, Hill alleged that the rent increase causes him to have less money for medical care,
food, and clothing; thus, he has suffered physical, financial, psychological, and emotional
injuries such as increased stress.  He also repeated his allegations of injury suffered by the
citizens of Lycoming County as a result of the allegedly corrupt real estate reassessments. 
As relief, Hill sought to bar the application of the 2004 reassessments and recover
reimbursement to county taxpayers for the costs of the reassessment process.  He also
sought revocation of the professional licenses of those who performed the appraisals and
referral of criminal charges to the appropriate authorities.  In addition, he sought damages
relief.  Concluding that Hill had again failed to allege an injury, the District Court
dismissed the complaint and deemed leave to amend to be futile.  Hill proceeded in
District Court with in forma pauperis status.  Hill has been granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal as well.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Upon consideration of the record and Hill’s informal brief on appeal, we will
dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of legal merit.  The
District Court correctly dismissed Hill’s complaint because Hill lacks standing to bring
his lawsuit.  Standing to bring a suit in federal court requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
(1) a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, injury in fact; (2) a causal link
between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3)  that a favorable ruling would
redress the injury.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  As
we stated in our opinion in Hill’s previous appeal, the emotional and psychological toll of
his perceived awareness of corruption and fraud is not a sufficient injury in fact, nor is
bringing a generalized grievance as a concerned citizen.  See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 616 (1989).  We also noted that Hill failed to show that he owned any real
estate subject to the reassessment.  Hill’s new allegation that his rent has been increased
does not amount to an injury that is causally linked to the allegations of corruption.  As
observed by the District Court, Hill’s landlord may increase (or decrease) rental rates
notwithstanding the reassessment of the rental property or the collection of property taxes
based on reassessment.  Further, as noted by the District Court, even if Hill had standing
to bring his complaint of an illegal taxation scheme, the District Court would lack subject
matter jurisdiction in light of the Federal Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.  See Behe
v. Chester County Bd. Of Assessment Appeals, 952 F.2d 66, 68 (Federal Tax Injunction
Act bars federal jurisdiction over homeowners’ claims of unfair taxation and violations of
due process and equal protection, because Pennsylvania offers adequate remedy to
challenge property assessment procedures).
On appeal, Hill argues that the District Court erred in concluding that Hill could
have amended his previous complaint to present his additional allegations of injury, rather
than commencing this second lawsuit.  Hill states that he could not have amended his
previous complaint (which was dismissed in December 2004) with his allegation of new
injury, because his rent was increased in 2005.  Be that as it may, that circumstance does
not alter our analysis in concluding that this appeal lacks legal merit.
For the reasons stated, we will dismiss this appeal under section 1915(e)(2)(B).
